apparmor.d

APPARMOR.D(5) AppArmor APPARMOR.D(5)

NAME

   apparmor.d - syntax of security profiles for AppArmor.

DESCRIPTION

   AppArmor profiles describe mandatory access rights granted to given programs and are fed to the AppArmor policy enforcement module using apparmor_parser(8). This man page describes
   the format of the AppArmor configuration files; see apparmor(7) for an overview of AppArmor.

   Some features are not supported on Debian yet:

   Network Rules
   DBus rules
   Unix socket rules

FORMAT

   AppArmor  policy  is  written  in  a  declarative  language, in which the order of rules within a given section or block does not matter. Policy is by convention written so that it is
   contained in multiple files, but this is not a requirement. It could just as easily be written in a single file. The policy language is compiled to a architecture  independent  binary
   format that is loaded into the kernel for enforcement.

   The base unit of AppArmor confinement is the profile. It contains a set of rules which are enforced when the profile is associated with a running program. The rules within the profile
   provide a whitelist of different permission that are allowed, along with a few other special rules.

   The  text  in AppArmor policy is split into two sections, the preamble and the profile definitions. The preamble must occur at the head of the file and once profile definitions begin,
   no more preamble rules are allowed (even in files that are included into the profile). When AppArmor policy (set of profiles) is split across multiple files, each file  can  have  its
   own preamble section, which may be the same or different from other files preamble. Files included within a profile section can not have a preamble section.

   The  following  is  a  BNF-style  description of AppArmor policy configuration files; see below for an example AppArmor policy file.  AppArmor configuration files are line-oriented; #
   introduces a comment, similar to shell scripting languages. The exception to this rule is that #include will include the contents of a file inline to the  policy;  this  behaviour  is
   modelled after cpp(1).

       PROFILE FILE = ( [ PREAMBLE ] [ PROFILE ] )*

       PREAMBLE = ( COMMENT | VARIABLE ASSIGNMENT | ALIAS RULE | INCLUDE | ABI )*
         Variable assignment and alias rules must come before the profile.

       VARIABLE ASSIGNMENT = VARIABLE ('=' | '+=') (space separated values)

       VARIABLE = '@{' ALPHA [ ( ALPHANUMERIC | '_' ) ... ] '}'

       ALIAS RULE = 'alias' ABS PATH '->' REWRITTEN ABS PATH ','

       INCLUDE = ( '#include' | 'include' ) [ 'if exists' ] ( ABS PATH | MAGIC PATH )

       ABI = ( 'abi' ) ( ABS PATH | MAGIC PATH ) ','

       ABS PATH = '"' path '"' (the path is passed to open(2))

       MAGIC PATH = '<' relative path '>'
         The path is relative to /etc/apparmor.d/.

       COMMENT = '#' TEXT [ '\r' ] '\n'

       TEXT = any characters

       PROFILE = ( PROFILE HEAD ) [ ATTACHMENT SPECIFICATION ] [ PROFILE FLAG CONDS ] '{' ( RULES )* '}'

       PROFILE HEAD = [ 'profile' ] FILEGLOB | 'profile' PROFILE NAME

       PROFILE NAME ( UNQUOTED PROFILE NAME | QUOTED PROFILE NAME )

       QUOTED PROFILE NAME = '"' UNQUOTED PROFILE NAME '"'

       UNQUOTED PROFILE NAME = (must start with alphanumeric character (after variable expansion), or '/' AARE have special meanings; see below. May include VARIABLE. Rules with embedded
       spaces or tabs must be quoted.)

       ATTACHMENT SPECIFICATION = [ PROFILE_EXEC_COND ] [ PROFILE XATTR CONDS ]

       PROFILE_EXEC_COND = FILEGLOB

       PROFILE XATTR CONDS =  [ 'xattrs=' ] '(' comma or white space separated list of PROFILE XATTR ')'

       PROFILE XATTR = extended attribute name '=' XATTR VALUE FILEGLOB

       XATTR VALUE FILEGLOB = FILEGLOB

       PROFILE FLAG CONDS =  [ 'flags=' ] '(' comma or white space separated list of PROFILE FLAGS ')'

       PROFILE  FLAGS  =  PROFILE  MODE  |  AUDIT_MODE | 'mediate_deleted' | 'attach_disconnected' | 'attach_disconnected.path='ABS PATH | 'chroot_relative' | 'debug' | 'interruptible' |
       'kill.signal='SIGNAL | 'error='ERROR CODE

       ERROR CODE = (case insensitive error code name starting with 'E'; see errno(3))

       PROFILE MODE = 'enforce' | 'complain' | 'kill' | 'default_allow' | 'unconfined' | 'prompt'

       AUDIT MODE = 'audit'

       RULES = [ ( LINE RULES | COMMA RULES ',' | BLOCK RULES )

       LINE RULES = ( COMMENT | INCLUDE ) [ '\r' ] '\n'

       COMMA RULES = ( CAPABILITY RULE | NETWORK RULE | MOUNT RULE | PIVOT ROOT RULE | UNIX RULE | FILE RULE | LINK RULE | CHANGE_PROFILE RULE | RLIMIT RULE | DBUS RULE | MQUEUE  RULE  |
       IO_URING RULE | USERNS RULE | ALL RULE)

       BLOCK RULES = ( SUBPROFILE | HAT | QUALIFIER BLOCK )

       SUBPROFILE = 'profile' PROFILE NAME [ ATTACHMENT SPECIFICATION ] [ PROFILE FLAG CONDS ] '{' ( RULES )* '}'

       HAT = ('hat' | '^') HATNAME [ PROFILE FLAG CONDS ] '{' ( RULES )* '}'

       HATNAME  =  (must start with alphanumeric character. See aa_change_hat(2) for a description of how this "hat" is used. If '^' is used to start a hat then there is no space between
       the '^' and HATNAME)

       QUALIFIER BLOCK = QUALIFIERS BLOCK

       INTEGER = (+ | -)? [[:digit:]]+

       ACCESS TYPE = ( 'allow' | 'deny' )

       QUALIFIERS = [ 'priority' '=' <INTEGER> ] [ 'audit' ] [ ACCESS TYPE ]

       CAPABILITY RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'capability' [ CAPABILITY LIST ]

       CAPABILITY LIST = ( CAPABILITY )+

       CAPABILITY = (lowercase capability name without 'CAP_' prefix; see capabilities(7))

       NETWORK RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'network' [ NETWORK ACCESS EXPR ] [ DOMAIN ] [ TYPE | PROTOCOL ] [ NETWORK LOCAL EXPR ] [ NETWORK PEER EXPR ]

       NETWORK ACCESS EXPR = ( NETWORK ACCESS | NETWORK ACCESS LIST )

       NETWORK ACCESS = ( 'create' | 'bind' | 'listen' | 'accept' | 'connect' | 'shutdown' | 'getattr' | 'setattr' | 'getopt' | 'setopt' | 'send' | 'receive' | 'r' | 'w' | 'rw' )
         Some access modes are incompatible with some rules.

       NETWORK ACCESS LIST = '(' NETWORK ACCESS ( [','] NETWORK ACCESS )* ')'

       DOMAIN = ( 'unix' | 'inet' | 'ax25' | 'ipx' | 'appletalk' | 'netrom' | 'bridge' | 'atmpvc' | 'x25' | 'inet6' | 'rose' | 'netbeui' | 'security' | 'key' |  'netlink'  |  'packet'  |
       'ash'  |  'econet'  |  'atmsvc'  |  'rds'  |  'sna'  | 'irda' | 'pppox' | 'wanpipe' | 'llc' | 'ib' | 'mpls' | 'can' | 'tipc' | 'bluetooth' | 'iucv' | 'rxrpc' | 'isdn' | 'phonet' |
       'ieee802154' | 'caif' | 'alg' | 'nfc' | 'vsock' | 'kcm' | 'qipcrtr' | 'smc' | 'xdp' | 'mctp' ) ','

       TYPE = ( 'stream' | 'dgram' | 'seqpacket' |  'rdm' | 'raw' | 'packet' )

       PROTOCOL = ( 'tcp' | 'udp' | 'icmp' )

       NETWORK LOCAL EXPR = ( NETWORK IP COND | NETWORK PORT COND )*
         Each cond can appear at most once.

       NETWORK PEER EXPR = 'peer' '=' '(' ( NETWORK IP COND | NETWORK PORT COND )+ ')'
         Each cond can appear at most once.

       NETWORK IP COND = 'ip' '=' ( 'none' | NETWORK IPV4 | NETWORK IPV6 )

       NETWORK PORT COND = 'port' '=' ( NETWORK PORT | NETWORK PORT '-' NETWORK PORT )

       NETWORK IPV4 = IPv4, represented by four 8-bit decimal numbers separated by '.'

       NETWORK IPV6 = IPv6, represented by eight groups of four hexadecimal numbers separated by ':'. Shortened representation of contiguous zeros is allowed by using '::'

       NETWORK PORT = 16-bit number ranging from 0 to 65535

       MOUNT RULE = ( MOUNT | REMOUNT | UMOUNT )

       MOUNT = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'mount' [ MOUNT CONDITIONS ] [ SOURCE FILEGLOB ] [ '->' [ MOUNTPOINT FILEGLOB ]

       REMOUNT = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'remount' [ MOUNT CONDITIONS ] MOUNTPOINT FILEGLOB

       UMOUNT = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'umount' [ MOUNT CONDITIONS ] MOUNTPOINT FILEGLOB

       MOUNT CONDITIONS = [ ( 'fstype' | 'vfstype' ) ( '=' | 'in' ) MOUNT FSTYPE EXPRESSION ] [ 'options' ( '=' | 'in' ) MOUNT FLAGS EXPRESSION ]

       MOUNT FSTYPE EXPRESSION = ( MOUNT FSTYPE LIST | MOUNT EXPRESSION )

       MOUNT FSTYPE LIST = Comma separated list of valid filesystem and virtual filesystem types (eg ext4, debugfs, devfs, etc)

       MOUNT FLAGS EXPRESSION = ( MOUNT FLAGS LIST | MOUNT EXPRESSION )

       MOUNT FLAGS LIST = Comma separated list of MOUNT FLAGS.

       MOUNT FLAGS = ( 'ro' | 'rw' | 'nosuid' | 'suid' | 'nodev' | 'dev' | 'noexec' | 'exec' | 'sync' | 'async' | 'remount' | 'mand' | 'nomand'  |  'dirsync'  |  'noatime'  |  'atime'  |
       'nodiratime'  |  'diratime'  |  'bind'  |  'rbind'  |  'move' | 'verbose' | 'silent' | 'loud' | 'acl' | 'noacl' | 'unbindable' | 'runbindable' | 'private' | 'rprivate' | 'slave' |
       'rslave' | 'shared' | 'rshared' | 'relatime' | 'norelatime' | 'iversion' | 'noiversion' | 'strictatime' | 'nostrictatime' |  'lazytime'  |  'nolazytime'  |  'nouser'  |  'user'  |
       'symfollow' | 'nosymfollow' )

       MOUNT EXPRESSION = ( ALPHANUMERIC | AARE ) ...

       MQUEUE_RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'mqueue' [ MQUEUE ACCESS PERMISSIONS ] [ MQUEUE TYPE ] [ MQUEUE LABEL ] [ MQUEUE NAME ]

       MQUEUE ACCESS PERMISSIONS = MQUEUE ACCESS | MQUEUE ACCESS LIST

       MQUEUE ACCESS LIST = '(' Comma or space separated list of MQUEUE ACCESS ')'

       MQUEUE ACCESS = ( 'r' | 'w' | 'rw' | 'read' | 'write' | 'create' | 'open' | 'delete' | 'getattr' | 'setattr' )

       MQUEUE TYPE = 'type' '=' ( 'posix' | 'sysv' )

       MQUEUE LABEL = 'label' '=' '(' '"' AARE '"' | AARE ')'

       MQUEUE NAME = AARE

       USERNS RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'userns' [ USERNS ACCESS PERMISSIONS ]

       USERNS ACCESS PERMISSIONS = ( 'create' )

       IO_URING RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'io_uring' [ IO_URING ACCESS PERMISSIONS [ IO_URING LABEL ]

       IO_URING ACCESS PERMISSIONS = ( 'sqpoll' | 'override_creds' )

       IO_URING LABEL = 'label' '=' '(' '"' AARE '"' | AARE ')'

       PIVOT ROOT RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] pivot_root [ oldroot=OLD PUT FILEGLOB ] [ NEW ROOT FILEGLOB ] [ '->' PROFILE NAME ]

       SOURCE FILEGLOB = FILEGLOB

       MOUNTPOINT FILEGLOB = FILEGLOB

       OLD PUT FILEGLOB = FILEGLOB

       PTRACE_RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'ptrace' [ PTRACE ACCESS PERMISSIONS ] [ PTRACE PEER ]

       PTRACE ACCESS PERMISSIONS = PTRACE ACCESS | PTRACE ACCESS LIST

       PTRACE ACCESS LIST = '(' Comma or space separated list of PTRACE ACCESS ')'

       PTRACE ACCESS = ( 'r' | 'w' | 'rw' | 'read' | 'readby' | 'trace' | 'tracedby' )

       PTRACE PEER = 'peer' '=' AARE

       SIGNAL_RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'signal' [ SIGNAL ACCESS PERMISSIONS ] [ SIGNAL SET ] [ SIGNAL PEER ]

       SIGNAL ACCESS PERMISSIONS = SIGNAL ACCESS | SIGNAL ACCESS LIST

       SIGNAL ACCESS LIST = '(' Comma or space separated list of SIGNAL ACCESS ')'

       SIGNAL ACCESS = ( 'r' | 'w' | 'rw' | 'read' | 'write' | 'send' | 'receive' )

       SIGNAL SET = 'set' '=' '(' SIGNAL LIST ')'

       SIGNAL LIST = Comma or space separated list of SIGNALs

       SIGNAL  = ( 'hup' | 'int' | 'quit' | 'ill' | 'trap' | 'abrt' | 'bus' | 'fpe' | 'kill' | 'usr1' | 'segv' | 'usr2' | 'pipe' | 'alrm' | 'term' | 'stkflt' | 'chld' | 'cont' | 'stop' |
       'stp' | 'ttin' | 'ttou' | 'urg' | 'xcpu' | 'xfsz' | 'vtalrm' | 'prof' | 'winch' | 'io' | 'pwr' | 'sys' | 'emt' | 'exists' | 'rtmin+0' ... 'rtmin+32' )

       SIGNAL PEER = 'peer' '=' AARE

       DBUS RULE = ( DBUS MESSAGE RULE | DBUS SERVICE RULE | DBUS EAVESDROP RULE | DBUS COMBINED RULE )

       DBUS MESSAGE RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'dbus' [ DBUS ACCESS EXPRESSION ] [ DBUS BUS ] [ DBUS PATH ] [ DBUS INTERFACE ] [ DBUS MEMBER ] [ DBUS PEER ]

       DBUS SERVICE RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'dbus' [ DBUS ACCESS EXPRESSION ] [ DBUS BUS ] [ DBUS NAME ]

       DBUS EAVESDROP RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'dbus' [ DBUS ACCESS EXPRESSION ] [ DBUS BUS ]

       DBUS COMBINED RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'dbus' [ DBUS ACCESS EXPRESSION ] [ DBUS BUS ]

       DBUS ACCESS EXPRESSION = ( DBUS ACCESS | '(' DBUS ACCESS LIST ')' )

       DBUS BUS = 'bus' '=' '(' 'system' | 'session' | '"' AARE '"' | AARE ')'

       DBUS PATH = 'path' '=' '(' '"' AARE '"' | AARE ')'

       DBUS INTERFACE = 'interface' '=' '(' '"' AARE '"' | AARE ')'

       DBUS MEMBER = 'member' '=' '(' '"' AARE '"' | AARE ')'

       DBUS PEER = 'peer' '=' '(' [ DBUS NAME ] [ DBUS LABEL ] ')'

       DBUS NAME = 'name' '=' '(' '"' AARE '"' | AARE ')'

       DBUS LABEL = 'label' '=' '(' '"' AARE '"' | AARE ')'

       DBUS ACCESS LIST = Comma separated list of DBUS ACCESS

       DBUS ACCESS = ( 'send' | 'receive' | 'bind' | 'eavesdrop' | 'r' | 'read' | 'w' | 'write' | 'rw' )
         Some accesses are incompatible with some rules; see below.

       UNIX RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'unix' [ UNIX ACCESS EXPR ] [ UNIX RULE CONDS ] [ UNIX LOCAL EXPR ] [ UNIX PEER EXPR ]

       UNIX ACCESS EXPR = ( UNIX ACCESS | UNIX ACCESS LIST )

       UNIX ACCESS = ( 'create' | 'bind' | 'listen' | 'accept' | 'connect' | 'shutdown' | 'getattr' | 'setattr' | 'getopt' | 'setopt' | 'send' | 'receive' | 'r' | 'w' | 'rw' )
         Some access modes are incompatible with some rules or require additional parameters.

       UNIX ACCESS LIST = '(' UNIX ACCESS ( [','] UNIX ACCESS )* ')'

       UNIX RULE CONDS = ( TYPE COND | PROTO COND )
         Each cond can appear at most once.

       TYPE COND = 'type' '='  ( AARE | '(' ( '"' AARE '"' | AARE )+ ')' )

       PROTO COND = 'protocol' '='  ( AARE | '(' ( '"' AARE '"' | AARE )+ ')' )

       UNIX LOCAL EXPR = ( UNIX ADDRESS COND | UNIX LABEL COND | UNIX ATTR COND | UNIX OPT COND )*
         Each cond can appear at most once.

       UNIX PEER EXPR = 'peer' '=' ( UNIX ADDRESS COND | UNIX LABEL COND )+
         Each cond can appear at most once.

       UNIX ADDRESS COND 'addr' '=' ( AARE | '(' '"' AARE '"' | AARE ')' )

       UNIX LABEL COND 'label' '=' ( AARE | '(' '"' AARE '"' | AARE ')' )

       UNIX ATTR COND 'attr' '=' ( AARE | '(' '"' AARE '"' | AARE ')' )

       UNIX OPT COND 'opt' '=' ( AARE | '(' '"' AARE '"' | AARE ')' )

       RLIMIT RULE = 'set' 'rlimit' [RLIMIT '<=' RLIMIT VALUE ]

       RLIMIT = ( 'cpu' | 'fsize' | 'data' | 'stack' | 'core' | 'rss' | 'nofile' | 'ofile' | 'as' | 'nproc' | 'memlock' | 'locks' | 'sigpending'  |  'msgqueue'  |  'nice'  |  'rtprio'  |
       'rttime' )

       RLIMIT VALUE = ( RLIMIT SIZE | RLIMIT NUMBER | RLIMIT TIME | RLIMIT NICE )

       RLIMIT SIZE = NUMBER ( 'K' | 'M' | 'G' )
         Only applies to RLIMIT of 'fsize', 'data', 'stack', 'core', 'rss', 'as', 'memlock', 'msgqueue'.

       RLIMIT NUMBER = number from 0 to max rlimit value.
         Only applies to RLIMIT of 'ofile', 'nofile', 'locks', 'sigpending', 'nproc', 'rtprio'.

       RLIMIT  TIME  =  NUMBER ( 'us' | 'microsecond' | 'microseconds' | 'ms' | 'millisecond' | 'milliseconds' | 's' | 'sec' | 'second' | 'seconds' | 'min' | 'minute' | 'minutes' | 'h' |
       'hour' | 'hours' | 'd' | 'day' | 'days' | 'week' | 'weeks' )
         Only applies to RLIMIT of 'cpu' and 'rttime'. RLIMIT 'cpu' only allows units >= 'seconds'.

       RLIMIT NICE = a number between -20 and 19.
         Only applies to RLIMIT of 'nice'.

       FILE RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] [ 'owner' ] ( 'file' | [ 'file' ] ( FILEGLOB ACCESS  | ACCESS FILEGLOB ) [ '->' EXEC TARGET ] )

       FILEGLOB = ( QUOTED FILEGLOB | UNQUOTED FILEGLOB )

       QUOTED FILEGLOB = '"' UNQUOTED FILEGLOB '"'

       UNQUOTED FILEGLOB = (must start with '/' (after variable expansion), AARE have special meanings; see below. May include VARIABLE. Rules  with  embedded  spaces  or  tabs  must  be
       quoted. Rules must end with '/' to apply to directories.)

       AARE = ?*[]{}^
         See section "Globbing (AARE)" below for meanings.

       ACCESS = ( 'r' | 'w' | 'a' | 'l' | 'k' | 'm' | EXEC TRANSITION )+  (not all combinations are allowed; see below.)

       EXEC TRANSITION =  ( 'ix' | 'ux' | 'Ux' | 'px' | 'Px' | 'cx' | 'Cx' | 'pix' | 'Pix' | 'cix' | 'Cix' | 'pux' | 'PUx' | 'cux' | 'CUx' | 'x' )
         A bare 'x' is only allowed in rules with the deny qualifier, everything else only without the deny qualifier.

       EXEC TARGET = name
         Requires EXEC TRANSITION specified.

       LINK RULE = QUALIFIERS [ 'owner' ] 'link' [ 'subset' ] FILEGLOB '->' FILEGLOB

       ALPHA = ('a', 'b', 'c', ... 'z', 'A', 'B', ... 'Z')

       ALPHANUMERIC = ('0', '1', '2', ... '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', ... 'z', 'A', 'B', ... 'Z')

       CHANGE_PROFILE RULE = 'change_profile' [ [ EXEC MODE ] EXEC COND ] [ '->' PROFILE NAME ]

       EXEC_MODE = ( 'safe' | 'unsafe' )

       EXEC COND = FILEGLOB

       ALL RULE = 'all'

   All  resources  and programs need a full path. There may be any number of subprofiles (aka child profiles) in a profile, limited only by kernel memory. Subprofile names are limited to
   974 characters.  Child profiles can be used to confine an application in a special way, or when you want the child to be unconfined on the system, but confined when  called  from  the
   parent.   Hats  are  a  special  child  profile  that  can  be used with the aa_change_hat(2) API call.  Applications written or modified to use aa_change_hat(2) can take advantage of
   subprofiles to run under different confinements, dependent on program logic. Several aa_change_hat(2)-aware applications exist, including an  Apache  module,  mod_apparmor(5);  a  PAM
   module,  pam_apparmor;  and  a Tomcat valve, tomcat_apparmor. Applications written or modified to use change_profile(2) transition permanently to the specified profile. libvirt is one
   such application.

Profile Head

   The profile head consists of a required name that is unique and optional attachment conditionals and control flags.

   Name

   The name of the profile is its identifier. It is what is displayed during introspection (eg. ps -Z), and defines how  the  profile  is  referenced  by  policy  rules  for  any  policy
   interaction  via  ipc or domain changes. It is recommended that the name be kept short and have meaning for the application it is being applied eg. firefox for the firefox web browser
   or its functional role eg. log_admin.

   If the name is an applications full absolute path name eg. /usr/bin/firefox and an exec attachment conditional is not specified the name is also used as the profile's exec  attachment
   conditional.  This use however has been deprecated and is discouraged as it makes for long names that can make profile rules difficult to understand, and may not be fully displayed by
   some introspection tools.

   Attachment Conditionals

   The attachment conditionals are used during profile changes to determine whether a profile is a match for the proposed profile transition. The attachment  conditionals  are  optional,
   how and when they are applied is determined by the specific condition(s) used.

   When attachment conditionals are used, the attachment conditionals for all profiles in the namespace will be evaluated. The profile with the set of attachments that result in the best
   match will become the new profile after a transition operation. Attachments that don't match will result in the profile not being available for transition.

   If no conditionals are specified the profile will only be used if a transition explicitly specifies the profile name.

   Exec Attachment Conditional

   The  exec  attachment  conditional  governs  how  closely the profile matches an executable program. This conditional is only used during an exec operation when the matching exec rule
   specifies either a px or cx (or their derivatives) transition type. The exec attachment conditional will also be used by tasks that are unconfined as they use a pix transition rule.

   If there are no attachment matches then it is up to the exec rule to determine what happens (fail or a fallback option).

   Note: see profile Name for information around using the profile name as an attachment conditional.

   Exec attachment conditionals can contain variable names and pattern matching.  They use a longest left match heuristic to deterime the winner in the case of multiple  matches  at  run
   time.  The  exact implementation of this resolution is kernel specific and has improved over time, while retaining backwards compatibility. If the heuristic can not determine a winner
   between multiple matches the exec will be denied.

   Extended Attributes Attachment Conditional

   AppArmor profiles have the ability to target files based on their xattr(7) values in addition to their path. For example, the following profile matches  files  in  /usr/bin  with  the
   attribute "security.apparmor" and value "trusted":

     /usr/bin/* xattrs(security.apparmor="trusted") {
       # ...
     }

   See apparmor_xattrs(7) for further details.

   Flags

   The  profile  flags  allow  modifying the behavior of the profile. If a profile flag is specified it takes priority over any conflicting flags that have been specified by rules in the
   profile body.

   Profile Mode

   The profile mode allow controlling the enforcement behavior of the profile rules.

   If no mode is specified the profile defaults to enforce mode.

   enforce For a given action, if the profile rules do not grant permission the action will be denied, with an EACCES or EPERM error code returned to userspace, and the violation will be
   logged with a tag of the access being DENIED.
   kill This is a variant of enforce mode where in addition to returning EACCES or EPERM for a violation, the task is also sent a signal to kill it.
   complain For a given action, if the profile rules do not grant permission the action will be allowed, but the violation will be logged with a tag of the access being ALLOWED.
   default_allow This mode changes the default behavior of apparmor from default deny to default allow. When default_allow is specified the resulting profile will allow operations that
   the profile does not have a rule for. This mode is similar to unconfined but allows for allow and deny rules, specifying audit, and domain transitions.  Profiles in this mode may be
   be reported as being in enforce mode or allow mode when introspected from the kernel.
           Note: default_allow is similar and for many profiles will be equivalent to specifying an allow all, rule in the profile. The default_allow flag does not provide all  the  same
           option that the allow all, rule provides.

   unconfined This mode allows a task confined by the profile to behave as though it is unconfined. The unconfined behavior can be later changed to confinement by using profile
   replacement. This mode should not be used under regular deployment but can be useful during debugging and some system initialization scenarios.
           This mode is similar to default_allow and may be emulated by default_allow in kernels that no longer support a true unconfined mode. It does not generally allow for specifying
           deny  rules,  or  allow  rules  that override the default behavior, except in a few custom kernels where unconfined restricts a few operations. It relies on special customized
           behavior of the unconfined profile in the kernel and as such should only be used for debugging.

           Note: true unconfined is being phased out, with unconfined becoming a replaceable profile. As such unconfined mode will be emulated by a  special  profile  compiled  with  the
           default_allow flag in newer kernels.

   prompt This mode allows task mediation to send an up call to userspace to ask for a decision when there isn't a rule covering the permission request. If userspace does not respond
   then the access will be denied.

   Audit Mode

   The audit mode allows control of how AppArmor messages are are logged to the audit system.

   audit This flag causes all actions whether allowed or denied to be logged.

   Misc modes

   mediate_deleted This forces AppArmor to mediate deleted files as if they still exist in the file system.
   attach_disconnected This forces AppArmor to attach disconnected objects to the task's namespace and mediate them as though they are part of the namespace. WARNING this mode is unsafe
   and can result in aliasing and access to objects that should not be allowed. Its intent is a debug and policy development tool.
   attach_disconnected.path=ABS PATH Like attach_disconnected, but attach disconnected objects to the supplied path instead of the root of the namespace.
   chroot_relative This forces file names to be relative to a chroot and behave as if the chroot is a mount namespace.
   debug This flag allows turning on kernel debug messages on a per profile basis. It works in conjunction with other kernel debug flags to control what messages will be output. Its
   effect is kernel dependent, and it should never appear in policy except when trying to debug kernel or policy problems.
   interruptible Enables interrupts for prompt upcall to userspace.
   kill.signal=SIGNAL This changes the signal that will be sent by AppArmor when in kill mode or a kill rule has been violated.
   error=ERROR CODE This changes the error code returned by AppArmor when a rule has been violated.

Access Modes

   File permission access modes consists of combinations of the following modes:

   r       - read

   w       - write -- conflicts with append

   a       - append -- conflicts with write

   ux      - unconfined execute

   Ux      - unconfined execute -- scrub the environment

   px      - discrete profile execute

   Px      - discrete profile execute -- scrub the environment

   cx      - transition to subprofile on execute

   Cx      - transition to subprofile on execute -- scrub the environment

   ix      - inherit execute

   pix     - discrete profile execute with inherit fallback

   Pix     - discrete profile execute with inherit fallback -- scrub the environment

   cix     - transition to subprofile on execute with inherit fallback

   Cix     - transition to subprofile on execute with inherit fallback -- scrub the environment

   pux     - discrete profile execute with fallback to unconfined

   PUx     - discrete profile execute with fallback to unconfined -- scrub the environment

   cux     - transition to subprofile on execute with fallback to unconfined

   CUx     - transition to subprofile on execute with fallback to unconfined -- scrub the environment

   deny x  - disallow execute (in rules with the deny qualifier)

   m       - allow PROT_EXEC with mmap(2) calls

   l       - link

   k       - lock

Access Modes Details

   r - Read mode
       Allows the program to have read access to the file or directory listing. Read access is required for shell scripts and other interpreted content.

   w - Write mode
       Allows  the  program  to  have  write  access  to  the file. Files and directories must have this permission if they are to be unlinked (removed.)  Write mode is not required on a
       directory to rename or create files within the directory.

       This mode conflicts with append mode.

   a - Append mode
       Allows the program to have a limited appending only write access to the file.  Append mode will prevent an application from opening  the  file  for  write  unless  it  passes  the
       O_APPEND parameter flag on open.

       The mode conflicts with Write mode.

   ux - Unconfined execute mode
       Allows the program to execute the program without any AppArmor profile being applied to the program.

       This  mode  is  useful  when  a  confined  program  needs to be able to perform a privileged operation, such as rebooting the machine. By placing the privileged section in another
       executable and granting unconfined execution rights, it is possible to bypass the mandatory constraints imposed on  all  confined  processes.  For  more  information  on  what  is
       constrained, see the apparmor(7) man page.

       WARNING  'ux'  should only be used in very special cases. It enables the designated child processes to be run without any AppArmor protection.  'ux' does not scrub the environment
       of variables such as LD_PRELOAD; as a result, the calling domain may have an undue amount of influence over the callee.  Use this mode only if the child  absolutely  must  be  run
       unconfined and LD_PRELOAD must be used. Any profile using this mode provides negligible security. Use at your own risk.

       Incompatible with other exec transition modes and the deny qualifier.

   Ux - unconfined execute -- scrub the environment
       'Ux'  allows  the  named  program  to run in 'ux' mode, but AppArmor will invoke the Linux Kernel's unsafe_exec routines to scrub the environment, similar to setuid programs. (See
       ld.so(8) for some information on setuid/setgid environment scrubbing.)

       WARNING 'Ux' should only be used in very special cases. It enables the designated child processes to be run without any AppArmor protection.  Use  this  mode  only  if  the  child
       absolutely must be run unconfined. Use at your own risk.

       Incompatible with other exec transition modes and the deny qualifier.

   px - Discrete Profile execute mode
       This mode requires that a discrete security profile is defined for a program executed and forces an AppArmor domain transition. If there is no profile defined then the access will
       be denied.

       WARNING 'px' does not scrub the environment of variables such as LD_PRELOAD; as a result, the calling domain may have an undue amount of influence over the callee.

       Incompatible with other exec transition modes and the deny qualifier.

   Px - Discrete Profile execute mode -- scrub the environment
       'Px'  allows  the  named  program  to run in 'px' mode, but AppArmor will invoke the Linux Kernel's unsafe_exec routines to scrub the environment, similar to setuid programs. (See
       ld.so(8) for some information on setuid/setgid environment scrubbing.)

       Incompatible with other exec transition modes and the deny qualifier.

   cx - Transition to Subprofile execute mode
       This mode requires that a local security profile is defined and forces an AppArmor domain transition to the named profile. If there is no profile defined then the access  will  be
       denied.

       WARNING 'cx' does not scrub the environment of variables such as LD_PRELOAD; as a result, the calling domain may have an undue amount of influence over the callee.

       Incompatible with other exec transition modes and the deny qualifier.

   Cx - Transition to Subprofile execute mode -- scrub the environment
       'Cx'  allows  the  named  program  to run in 'cx' mode, but AppArmor will invoke the Linux Kernel's unsafe_exec routines to scrub the environment, similar to setuid programs. (See
       ld.so(8) for some information on setuid/setgid environment scrubbing.)

       Incompatible with other exec transition modes and the deny qualifier.

   ix - Inherit execute mode
       Prevent the normal AppArmor domain transition on execve(2) when the profiled program executes the named program. Instead, the executed resource will inherit the current profile.

       This mode is useful when a confined program needs to call another confined program without gaining the permissions of the target's  profile,  or  losing  the  permissions  of  the
       current profile. There is no version to scrub the environment because 'ix' executions don't change privileges.

       Incompatible with other exec transition modes and the deny qualifier.

   Profile transition with inheritance fallback execute mode
       These  modes  attempt  to  perform  a  domain transition as specified by the matching permission (shown below) and if that transition fails to find the matching profile the domain
       transition proceeds using the 'ix' transition mode.

         'Pix' == 'Px' with fallback to 'ix'
         'pix' == 'px' with fallback to 'ix'
         'Cix' == 'Cx' with fallback to 'ix'
         'cix' == 'cx' with fallback to 'ix'

       Incompatible with other exec transition modes and the deny qualifier.

   Profile transition with unconfined fallback execute mode
       These modes attempt to perform a domain transition as specified by the matching permission (shown below) and if that transition fails to  find  the  matching  profile  the  domain
       transition proceeds using the 'ux' transition mode if 'pux', 'cux' or the 'Ux' transition mode if 'PUx', 'CUx' is used.

         'PUx' == 'Px' with fallback to 'Ux'
         'pux' == 'px' with fallback to 'ux'
         'CUx' == 'Cx' with fallback to 'Ux'
         'cux' == 'cx' with fallback to 'ux'

       Incompatible with other exec transition modes and the deny qualifier.

   deny x - Deny execute
       For rules including the deny modifier, only 'x' is allowed to deny execute.

       The 'ix', 'Px', 'px', 'Cx', 'cx' and the fallback modes conflict with the deny modifier.

   Directed profile transitions
       The  directed  ('px', 'Px', 'pix', 'Pix', 'pux', 'PUx') profile and subprofile ('cx', 'Cx', 'cix', 'Cix', 'cux', 'CUx') transitions normally determine the profile to transition to
       from the executable name. It is however possible to specify the name of the profile that the transition should use.

       The name of the profile to transition to is specified using the '->' followed by the name of the profile to transition to. Eg.

         /bin/** px -> profile,

       Incompatible with other exec transition modes.

   m - Allow executable mapping
       This mode allows a file to be mapped into memory using mmap(2)'s PROT_EXEC flag. This flag marks the pages executable; it is used on some architectures to  provide  non-executable
       data  pages,  which  can  complicate  exploit  attempts.  AppArmor  uses  this mode to limit which files a well-behaved program (or all programs on architectures that enforce non-
       executable memory access controls) may use as libraries, to limit the effect of invalid -L flags given to ld(1) and LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, given to ld.so(8).

   l - Link mode
       Allows the program to be able to create a link with this name.  When a link is created, the new link MUST have a subset of permissions as the original  file  (with  the  exception
       that the destination does not have to have link access.) If there is an 'x' rule on the new link, it must match the original file exactly.

   k - lock mode
       Allows the program to be able lock a file with this name.  This permission covers both advisory and mandatory locking.

   leading OR trailing access permissions
       File rules can be specified with the access permission either leading or trailing the file glob. Eg.

         rw /**,               # leading permissions

         /** rw,               # trailing permissions

       When leading permissions are used further rule options and context may be allowed, Eg.

         l /foo -> /bar,       # lead 'l' link permission is equivalent to link rules

Link rules

   Link  rules  allow specifying permission to form a hard link as a link target pair.  If the subset condition is specified then the permissions to access the link file must be a subset
   of the profiles permissions to access the target file. If there is an 'x' rule on the new link, it must match the original file exactly.

   Eg.

     /file1  r,
     /file2  rwk,
     /link*  rw,
     link subset /link* -> /**,

   The link rule allows linking of /link to both /file1 or /file2 by name however because the /link file has 'rw' permissions it is not allowed to link to /file1 because that would grant
   an access path to /file1 with more permissions than the 'r' permissions the profile specifies.

   A link of /link to /file2 would be allowed because the 'rw' permissions of /link are a subset of the 'rwk' permissions for /file1.

   The link rule is equivalent to specifying the 'l' link permission as a leading permission with no other file access permissions. When this  is  done  the  link  rule  options  can  be
   specified.

   The following link rule is equivalent to the 'l' permission file rule

     link /foo -> bar,
     l /foo -> /bar,

   File rules that specify the 'l' permission and don't specify the extend link permissions map to link rules as follows.

     /foo l,
     l /foo,
     link subset /foo -> /**,

Comments

   Comments start with # and may begin at any place within a line. The comment ends when the line ends. This is the same comment style as shell scripts.

Capabilities

   The  only  capabilities  a  confined  process  may use may be enumerated; for the complete list, please refer to capabilities(7). Note that granting some capabilities renders AppArmor
   confinement for that domain advisory; while open(2), read(2), write(2), etc., will still return error when access is not granted,  some  capabilities  allow  loading  kernel  modules,
   arbitrary access to IPC, ability to bypass discretionary access controls, and other operations that are typically reserved for the root user.

Network Rules

   AppArmor supports simple coarse grained network mediation.  The network rule restrict all socket(2) based operations.  The mediation done is a coarse-grained check on whether a socket
   of a given type and family can be created, read, or written. Network netlink(7) rules may only specify type 'dgram' and 'raw'.

   AppArmor network rules are accumulated so that the granted network permissions are the union of all the listed network rule permissions.

   AppArmor network rules are broad and general and become more restrictive as further information is specified.

   eg.

    network,               #allow access to all networking
    network tcp,           #allow access to tcp
    network inet tcp,      #allow access to tcp only for inet4 addresses
    network inet6 tcp,     #allow access to tcp only for inet6 addresses
    network netlink raw,   #allow access to AF_NETLINK SOCK_RAW

   Network permissions

   Network  rule  permissions are implied when a rule does not explicitly state an access list. By default if a rule does not have an access list all permissions that are compatible with
   the specified set of local and peer conditionals are implied.

   The create, bind, listen, shutdown, getattr, setattr, getopt, and setopt permissions are local socket permissions. They are only applied to the local socket and can't be specified  in
   rules  that  have  a  peer  conditional.  The  accept  permission  applies  to  the  combination of a local and peer socket. The connect, send, and receive permissions are peer socket
   permissions.

   Mediation of inet/inet6 family

   AppArmor supports fine grained mediation of the inet and inet6 families by using the ip and port conditionals. The ip  conditional  accepts  both  IPv4  and  IPv6  using  the  regular
   representation  of four octets separated by '.' for IPv4 and eight groups of four hexadecimal numbers separated by ':' for IPv6. Contiguous leading zeros can be replaced by '::' once.
   On a connected socket, the sender and receiver don't need to be specified in the recvfrom and sendto system calls. In that case, and with unbounded sockets, the IP address is none, or
   unknown. Unknown or Unbound IP addresses are represented in policy by the 'none' keyword. When the ip conditional is omitted, then all IP addresses will be  allowed:  IPv4,  IPv6  and
   none. If INADDR_ANY or in6addr_any is used, then the ip conditional can be omitted or they can be represented by:

    network ip=::,         #allow in6addr_any
    network ip=0.0.0.0;    #allow INADDR_ANY

   The network rules support the specification of local and remote IP addresses, ports, and port ranges.

    network ip=127.0.0.1 port=8080,
    network peer=(ip=10.139.15.23 port=8081),
    network ip=fd74:1820:b03a:b361::cf32 peer=(ip=fd74:1820:b03a:b361::a0f9),
    network port=8080 peer=(port=8081),
    network ip=127.0.0.1 port=8080 peer=(ip=10.139.15.23 port=8081),
    network ip=127.0.0.1 port=8080-8084,

Mount Rules

   AppArmor  supports  mount  mediation and allows specifying filesystem types and mount flags. The syntax of mount rules in AppArmor is based on the mount(8) command syntax. Mount rules
   must contain one of the mount, remount or umount keywords, but all mount conditions are optional. Unspecified  optional  conditionals  are  assumed  to  match  all  entries  (eg,  not
   specifying  fstype means all fstypes are matched). Due to the complexity of the mount command and how options may be specified, AppArmor allows specifying conditionals three different
   ways:

   1.  If a conditional is specified using '=', then the rule only grants permission for mounts matching the exactly specified options. For example, an AppArmor policy with the following
       rule:

           mount options=ro /dev/foo -> /mnt/,

       Would match:

           $ mount -o ro /dev/foo /mnt

       but not either of these:

           $ mount -o ro,atime /dev/foo /mnt

           $ mount -o rw /dev/foo /mnt

   2.  If a conditional is specified using 'in', then the rule grants permission for mounts matching any combination of the specified options. For example, if an AppArmor policy has  the
       following rule:

           mount options in (ro,atime) /dev/foo -> /mnt/,

       all of these mount commands will match:

           $ mount -o ro /dev/foo /mnt

           $ mount -o ro,atime /dev/foo /mnt

           $ mount -o atime /dev/foo /mnt

       but none of these will:

           $ mount -o ro,sync /dev/foo /mnt

           $ mount -o ro,atime,sync /dev/foo /mnt

           $ mount -o rw /dev/foo /mnt

           $ mount -o rw,noatime /dev/foo /mnt

           $ mount /dev/foo /mnt

   3.  If  multiple  conditionals  are specified in a single mount rule, then the rule grants permission for each set of options. This provides a shorthand when writing mount rules which
       might help to logically break up a conditional. For example, if an AppArmor policy has the following rule:

           mount options=ro options=atime,

       both of these mount commands will match:

           $ mount -o ro /dev/foo /mnt

           $ mount -o atime /dev/foo /mnt

       but this one will not:

           $ mount -o ro,atime /dev/foo /mnt

   Note that separate mount rules are distinct and the options do not accumulate.  For example, these AppArmor mount rules:

       mount options=ro,

       mount options=atime,

   are not equivalent to either of these mount rules:

       mount options=(ro,atime),

       mount options in (ro,atime),

   To help clarify the flexibility and complexity of mount rules, here are some example rules with accompanying matching commands:

   mount,
       the 'mount' rule without any conditionals is the most generic and allows any mount. Equivalent to 'mount fstype=** options=** ** -> /**'.

   mount /dev/foo,
       allow mounting of /dev/foo anywhere with any options. Some matching mount commands:

           $ mount /dev/foo /mnt

           $ mount -t ext3 /dev/foo /mnt

           $ mount -t vfat /dev/foo /mnt

           $ mount -o ro,atime,noexec,nodiratime /dev/foo /srv/some/mountpoint

   mount options=ro /dev/foo,
       allow mounting of /dev/foo anywhere, as read only. Some matching mount commands:

           $ mount -o ro /dev/foo /mnt

           $ mount -o ro /dev/foo /some/where/else

   mount options=(ro,atime) /dev/foo,
       allow mount of /dev/foo anywhere, as read only and using inode access times.  Some matching mount commands:

           $ mount -o ro,atime /dev/foo /mnt

           $ mount -o ro,atime /dev/foo /some/where/else

   mount options in (ro,atime) /dev/foo,
       allow mount of /dev/foo anywhere using some combination of 'ro' and 'atime' (see above). Some matching mount commands:

           $ mount -o ro /dev/foo /mnt

           $ mount -o atime /dev/foo /some/where/else

           $ mount -o ro,atime /dev/foo /some/other/place

   mount options=ro /dev/foo, mount options=atime /dev/foo,
       allow mount of /dev/foo anywhere as read only, and allow mount of /dev/foo anywhere using inode access times. Note this is expressed as two different rules. Matches:

           $ mount -o ro /dev/foo /mnt/1

           $ mount -o atime /dev/foo /mnt/2

   mount -> /mnt/**,
       allow mounting anything under a directory in /mnt/**. Some matching mount commands:

           $ mount /dev/foo1 /mnt/1

           $ mount -o ro,atime,noexec,nodiratime /dev/foo2 /mnt/deep/path/foo2

   mount options=ro -> /mnt/**,
       allow mounting anything under /mnt/**, as read only. Some matching mount commands:

           $ mount -o ro /dev/foo1 /mnt/1

           $ mount -o ro /dev/foo2 /mnt/deep/path/foo2

   mount fstype=ext3 options=(rw,atime) /dev/sdb1 -> /mnt/stick/,
       allow mounting an ext3 filesystem in /dev/sdb1 on /mnt/stick as read/write and using inode access times. Matches only:

           $ mount -o rw,atime /dev/sdb1 /mnt/stick

   mount options=(ro, atime) options in (nodev, user) /dev/foo -> /mnt/,
       allow mounting /dev/foo on /mmt/ read only and using inode access times or allow mounting /dev/foo on /mnt/ with some combination of 'nodev' and 'user'.  Matches only:

           $ mount -o ro,atime /dev/foo /mnt

           $ mount -o nodev /dev/foo /mnt

           $ mount -o user /dev/foo /mnt

           $ mount -o nodev,user /dev/foo /mnt

Message Queue rules

   AppArmor supports mediation of POSIX and SYSV message queues.

   AppArmor Message Queue permissions are implied when a rule does not explicitly state an access list. By default, all Message Queue permissions are implied.

   AppArmor Message Queue permissions become more restricted as further information is specified. Policy can be specified by determining its access mode, type, label, and  message  queue
   name.

   Regarding access modes, 'r' and 'read' are used to read messages from the queue.  'w' and 'write' are used to write to the message queue. 'create' is used to create the message queue,
   and  'open'  is used to get the message queue identifier when the queue is already created. 'delete' is used to remove the message queue. The access modes to get and set attributes of
   the message queue are 'setattr' and 'getattr'.

   The type of the policy can be either 'posix' or 'sysv'. This information is relevant when the message queue name is not specified, and when specified can  be  inferred  by  the  queue
   name, since message queues' name for posix must start with '/', and message queues' key for SYSV must be a positive integer.

   The policy label is the label assigned to the message queue when it is created.

   The message queue name can be either a string starting with '/' if the type is POSIX, or a positive integer if the type is SYSV. If the type is not specified, then it will be inferred
   by the queue name.

   Example AppArmor Message Queue rules:

       # Allow all Message Queue access
       mqueue,

       # Explicitly allow all Message Queue access,
       mqueue (create, open, delete, read, write, getattr, setattr),

       # Explicitly deny use of Message Queue
       deny mqueue,

       # Allow all access for POSIX queue of name /bar
       mqueue type=posix /bar,

       # Allow create permission for a SYSV queue of label foo
       mqueue create label=foo 123,

User Namespace Rules

   User namespaces are part of many sandboxing and containerization solutions.  They provide a way for a non-system root process to be root within the container. Unfortunately this opens
   up attack surface in the kernel and has been part of several exploit chains. As such AppArmor can be used to restrict the creation of user namespaces to select processes.

   User namespace permission are implied when a rule does not explicitly state an access list. The rule becomes more restrictive as further information is specified.

   Note:  user namespace creation may be restricted so that it is not available to unprivieged unconfined processes. If this is the case any process trying to create user namespaces will
   require a profile that allows the necessary permissions.

   create
       Allow creation of user namespaces.

   Example userns rules:

     # Allow all userns perms
     userns,

     # Allow creation of a userns
     userns create,

IO_URing Rules

   AppArmor supports mediation of the new Linux high speed IO interface.  There is limited mediation at this time to just a few permissions at the moment.

   IO Uring permission are implied when a rule does not explicitly state an access list. The rule becomes more restrictive as further information is specified.

   Note: io_uring access may be restricted so that it is not available to unprivileged unconfined processes. If this is the case any process trying to use io_uring will require a profile
   that allows the necessary io_uring permissions.

   sqpoll
       All the task confined by the profile to spawn a io_uring polling thread.

   override_creds
       Grants the task confined by the profile to override (change) its credentials to the specified label, when executing an io_uring operation.

   Example IO_URING rules:

     # Allow io_uring operations
     io_uring,

     # Allow creation of a polling thread
     io_uring sqpoll,

     # Allow task to override credentials during io_uring operation
     io_uring override_creds label=new_creds,

Pivot Root Rules

   AppArmor mediates changing of the root filesystem through the pivot_root(2) system call. The syntax of 'pivot_root' rules in  AppArmor  is  based  on  the  pivot_root(2)  system  call
   parameters  with the notable exception that the ordering is reversed. The path corresponding to the put_old parameter of pivot_root(2) is optionally specified in the 'pivot_root' rule
   using the 'oldroot=' prefix.

   AppArmor 'pivot_root' rules can specify a profile transition to occur during the pivot_root(2) system call. Note that currently, this feature is not supported by any kernel. When this
   feature will be supported, AppArmor will only transition the process calling pivot_root(2) to the new profile.

   The paths specified in 'pivot_root' rules must end with '/' since they are directories.

   Here are some example 'pivot_root' rules:

       # Allow any pivot
       pivot_root,

       # Allow pivoting to any new root directory and putting the old root
       # directory at /mnt/root/old/
       pivot_root oldroot=/mnt/root/old/,

       # Allow pivoting the root directory to /mnt/root/
       pivot_root /mnt/root/,

       # Allow pivoting to /mnt/root/ and putting the old root directory at
       # /mnt/root/old/
       pivot_root oldroot=/mnt/root/old/ /mnt/root/,

       # Allow pivoting to /mnt/root/, putting the old root directory at
       # /mnt/root/old/ and transition to the /mnt/root/sbin/init profile
       pivot_root oldroot=/mnt/root/old/ /mnt/root/ -> /mnt/root/sbin/init,

PTrace rules

   AppArmor supports mediation of ptrace(2). AppArmor PTrace rules are accumulated so that the granted PTrace permissions are the union of all the listed PTrace rule permissions.

   AppArmor PTrace permissions are implied when a rule does not explicitly state an access list. By default, all PTrace permissions are implied.

   The trace and tracedby permissions govern ptrace(2) while read and readby govern certain proc(5) filesystem accesses, kcmp(2), futexes (get_robust_list(2)) and perf trace events.

   For a ptrace operation to be allowed the profile of the tracing process and the profile of the target task must both have the correct permissions. For  example,  the  profile  of  the
   process  attaching  to  another task must have the trace permission for the target task's profile, and the task being traced must have the tracedby permission for the tracing process'
   profile.

   Example AppArmor PTrace rules:

       # Allow all PTrace access
       ptrace,

       # Explicitly allow all PTrace access,
       ptrace (read, readby, trace, tracedby),

       # Explicitly deny use of ptrace(2)
       deny ptrace (trace),

       # Allow unconfined processes (eg, a debugger) to ptrace us
       ptrace (readby, tracedby) peer=unconfined,

       # Allow ptrace of a process running under the /usr/bin/foo profile
       ptrace (trace) peer=/usr/bin/foo,

Signal rules

   AppArmor supports mediation of signal(7). AppArmor signal rules are accumulated so that the granted signal permissions are the union of all the listed signal rule permissions.

   AppArmor signal permissions are implied when a rule does not explicitly state an access list. By default, all signal permissions are implied.

   For the sending of a signal to be allowed, the profile of the sending process and the profile of the target task must both have the correct permissions. For example, the profile of  a
   process  sending a signal to another task must have the send permission for the target task's profile, and the task receiving the signal must have a receive permission for the sending
   process' profile.

   Example AppArmor signal rules:

       # Allow all signal access
       signal,

       # Explicitly deny sending the HUP and INT signals
       deny signal (send) set=(hup, int),

       # Allow unconfined processes to send us signals
       signal (receive) peer=unconfined,

       # Allow sending of signals to a process running under the /usr/bin/foo
       # profile
       signal (send) peer=/usr/bin/foo,

       # Allow checking for PID existence
       signal (receive, send) set=("exists"),

       # Allow us to signal ourselves using the built-in @{profile_name} variable
       signal peer=@{profile_name},

       # Allow two real-time signals
       signal set=(rtmin+0 rtmin+32),

DBus rules

   AppArmor supports DBus mediation. The mediation is performed in conjunction with the DBus daemon. The DBus daemon verifies that communications over the bus are permitted  by  AppArmor
   policy.

   AppArmor DBus rules are accumulated so that the granted DBus permissions are the union of all the listed DBus rule permissions.

   AppArmor DBus rules are broad and general and become more restrictive as further information is specified. Policy may be specified down to the interface member level (method or signal
   name), however the contents of messages are not examined.

   Some  AppArmor DBus permissions are not compatible with all AppArmor DBus rules.  The 'bind' permission cannot be used in message rules. The 'send' and 'receive' permissions cannot be
   used in service rules. The 'eavesdrop' permission cannot be used in rules containing any conditionals outside of the 'bus' conditional.

   'r' and 'read' are synonyms for 'receive'. 'w' and 'write' are synonyms for 'send'. 'rw' is a synonym for both 'send' and 'receive'.

   AppArmor DBus permissions are implied when a rule does not explicitly state an access list. By default, all DBus permissions are implied. Only  message  permissions  are  implied  for
   message rules and only service permissions are implied for service rules.

   Example AppArmor DBus rules:

       # Allow all DBus access
       dbus,

       # Explicitly allow all DBus access,
       dbus (send, receive, bind),

       # Deny send/receive/bind access to the session bus
       deny dbus bus=session,

       # Allow bind access for a particular name on any bus
       dbus bind name=com.example.ExampleName,

       # Allow receive access for a particular path and interface
       dbus receive path=/com/example/path interface=com.example.Interface,

       # Deny send/receive access to the system bus for a particular interface
       deny dbus bus=system interface=com.example.ExampleInterface,

       # Allow send access for a particular path, interface, member, and pair of
       # peer names:
       dbus send
            bus=session
            path=/com/example/path
            interface=com.example.Interface
            member=ExampleMethod
            peer=(name=(com.example.ExampleName1|com.example.ExampleName2)),

       # Allow receive access for all unconfined peers
       dbus receive peer=(label=unconfined),

       # Allow eavesdropping on the system bus
       dbus eavesdrop bus=system,

       # Allow and audit all eavesdropping
       audit dbus eavesdrop,

Unix socket rules

   AppArmor supports fine grained mediation of unix domain abstract and anonymous sockets. Unix domain sockets with file system paths are mediated via file access rules.

   Abstract unix domain sockets is a nonportable Linux extension of unix domain sockets, see unix(7) for more information.

   Unix socket address paths

   The sun_path component (aka the socket address) of a unix domain socket is specified by the

     addr=

   conditional. If an address conditional is not specified as part of a rule then the rule matches both abstract and anonymous sockets.

   In  apparmor  the  address  of  an abstract unix domain socket begins with the @ character, similar to how they are reported (as paths) by netstat -x. The address then follows and may
   contain pattern matching and any characters including the null character. In apparmor null characters must be specified by using an escape sequence \000 or \x00. The pattern  matching
   is the same as is used by file path matching so * will not match / even though it has no special meaning with in an abstract socket name. Eg.

     unix addr=@*,

   Autobound  unix  domain  sockets  have  a  unix  sun_path assigned to them by the kernel, as such specifying a policy based address is not possible.  The autobinding of sockets can be
   controlled by specifying the special auto keyword. Eg.

     unix addr=auto,

   To indicate that the rule only applies to auto binding of unix domain sockets. It is important to note this only applies to the bind permission as once  the  socket  is  bound  to  an
   address  it is indistinguishable from a socket that have an addr bound with a specified name. When the auto keyword is used with other permissions or as part of a peer addr it will be
   replaced with a pattern that can match an autobound socket. Eg. For some kernels

     unix rw addr=auto,

   is transformed to

     unix rw addr=@[a-f0-9][a-f0-9][a-f0-9][a-f0-9][a-f0-9],

   It is important to note, this pattern may match abstract sockets that were not autobound but have an addr that fits what is generated by the kernel when autobinding a socket.

   Anonymous unix domain sockets have no sun_path associated with the socket address, however it can be specified with the special none keyword to  indicate  the  rule  only  applies  to
   anonymous unix domain sockets. Eg.

     unix addr=none,

   If the address component of a rule is not specified then the rule applies to autobind, abstract and anonymous sockets.

   Unix socket permissions

   Unix domain socket rules are accumulated so that the granted unix socket permissions are the union of all the listed unix rule permissions.

   Unix  domain  socket rules are broad and general and become more restrictive as further information is specified. Policy may be specified down to the socket address (aka sun_path) and
   label level. The content of the communication is not examined.

   Unix socket rule permissions are implied when a rule does not explicitly state an access list. By default if a rule does not have an access list all permissions  that  are  compatible
   with the specified set of local and peer conditionals are implied.

   The  create, bind, listen, shutdown, getattr, setattr, getopt, and setopt permissions are local socket permissions. They are only applied to the local socket and can't be specified in
   rules that have a peer component. The accept permission applies to the combination of a local and peer socket. The connect, send, and receive permissions are peer socket permissions.

   Only the peer socket permissions will be applied to rules that don't specify permissions and contain a peer component.

   Example Unix domain socket rules:

     # Allow all permissions to unix sockets
     unix,

     # Explicitly allow all unix permissions
     unix (create, listen, accept, connect, send, receive, getattr, setattr, setopt, getopt),

     # Explicitly deny unix socket access
     deny unix,

     # Allow create and use of abstract and anonymous sockets for profile_name
     unix peer=(label=@{profile_name}),

     # Allow receiving via unix sockets from unconfined
     unix (receive) peer=(label=unconfined),

     # Allow getattr and shutdown on anonymous sockets
     unix (getattr, shutdown) addr=none,

     # Allow SOCK_STREAM connect, receive and send on an abstract socket @bar
     # with peer running under profile '/foo'
     unix (connect, receive, send) type=stream peer=(label=/foo,addr="@bar"),

     # Allow accepting connections from and receiving from peer running under
     # profile '/bar' on abstract socket '@foo'
     unix (accept, receive) addr=@foo peer=(label=/bar),

   Abstract unix domain sockets autobind

   Abstract unix domain sockets can autobind to an address. The autobind address is a unique 5 digit string of decimal numbers, eg. @00001. There is nothing that  prevents  a  task  from
   manually binding to addresses with a similar pattern so it is impossible to reliably identify autobind addresses from a regular address.

   Interaction of network rules and fine grained unix domain socket rules

   The  coarse grained networking rules can be used to control unix domain sockets as well. When fine grained unix domain socket mediation is available the coarse grained network rule is
   mapped into the equivalent unix socket rule.

   E.G.

       network unix,  =>  unix,

       network unix stream,   =>  unix stream,

   Fine grained mediation rules however can not be losslessly converted back to the coarse grained network rule; e.g.

      unix bind addr=@example,

   Has no exact match under coarse grained network rules, the closest match is the much wider permission rule of

      network unix,

change_profile rules

   AppArmor supports self directed profile transitions via the change_profile api. Change_profile rules control which permissions for which profiles a confined task  can  transition  to.
   The profile name can contain apparmor pattern matching to specify different profiles.

     change_profile -> **,

   The  change_profile  api  allows  the  transition  to  be  delayed  until when a task executes another application. If an exec rule transition is specified for the application and the
   change_profile api is used to make a transition at exec time, the transition specified by the change_profile api takes precedence.

   The Change_profile permission can restrict which profiles can be transitioned to based off of the executable name by specifying the exec condition.

     change_profile /bin/bash -> new_profile,

   The restricting of the transition profile to a given executable at exec time is only useful when then current task is allowed to make dynamic decisions about what  confinement  should
   be, but the decision set needs to be controlled. A list of profiles or multiple rules can be used to specify the profiles in the set. Eg.

     change_profile /bin/bash -> {new_profile1,new_profile2,new_profile3},

   An  exec  rule  can be used to specify a transition for the executable, if the transition should be allowed even if the change_profile api has not been used to select a transition for
   those available in the change_profile rule set.  Eg.

     /bin/bash Px -> new_profile1,
     change_profile /bin/bash -> {new_profile1,new_profile2,new_profile3},

   The exec mode dictates whether or not the Linux Kernel's unsafe_exec routines should be used to scrub the environment, similar to setuid programs.  (See ld.so(8) for some  information
   on  setuid/setgid environment scrubbing.) The safe mode sets up environment scrubbing to occur when the new application is executed and unsafe mode disables AppArmor's requirement for
   environment scrubbing (the kernel and/or libc may still require environment scrubbing). An exec mode can only be specified when an exec condition is present.

     change_profile safe /bin/bash -> new_profile,

   Not all kernels support safe mode and the parser will downgrade rules to unsafe mode in that situation. If no exec mode is specified, the default is safe mode in kernels that  support
   it.

all rule

   The  all rule is used to add a generic rule for all supported rule types.  This is useful when policy wants to define a black list instead of white list, but can also be useful to add
   an access qualifier to all rules.

   Eg. Black list

     allow all,
     # begin blacklist
     deny file,
     deny unix,

   Eg. Adding audit qualifier

     audit access all,

rlimit rules

   AppArmor can set and control the resource limits associated with a profile as described in the setrlimit(2) man page.

   The AppArmor rlimit controls allow setting of limits and restricting changes of them and these actions can be audited. Enforcement of the set limits is handled by the standard  kernel
   enforcement mechanism for rlimits and will not result in an audited apparmor message if the limit is enforced.

   If  a  profile  does  not have an rlimit rule associated with a given rlimit then the rlimit is left alone and regular access, including changing the limit, is allowed. However if the
   profile sets an rlimit then the current limit is checked and if greater than the limit specified in the rule it will be changed to the specified limit.

   AppArmor rlimit rules control the hard limit of an application and ensure that if the hard limit is lowered that the soft limit does not exceed the hard limit value.

   Eg.

     set rlimit data <= 100M,
     set rlimit nproc <= 10,
     set rlimit nice <= 5,

Variables

   AppArmor's policy language allows embedding variables into file rules to enable easier configuration for some common (and  pervasive)  setups.   Variables  may  have  multiple  values
   assigned, but any variable assignments must be made before the start of the profile.

   The  parser  will automatically expand variables to include all values that they have been assigned; it is an error to reference a variable without setting at least one value. You can
   use empty quotes ("") to explicitly add an empty value.

   At the time of this writing, the following variables are defined in the provided AppArmor policy:

     @{HOME}
     @{HOMEDIRS}
     @{multiarch}
     @{pid}
     @{pids}
     @{PROC}
     @{securityfs}
     @{apparmorfs}
     @{sys}
     @{tid}
     @{run}
     @{XDG_DESKTOP_DIR}
     @{XDG_DOWNLOAD_DIR}
     @{XDG_TEMPLATES_DIR}
     @{XDG_PUBLICSHARE_DIR}
     @{XDG_DOCUMENTS_DIR}
     @{XDG_MUSIC_DIR}
     @{XDG_PICTURES_DIR}
     @{XDG_VIDEOS_DIR}

   These are defined in files in /etc/apparmor.d/tunables and are used in many of the abstractions described later.

   You  may  also  add  files  in  /etc/apparmor.d/tunables/home.d  for  site-specific  customization  of   @{HOMEDIRS},   /etc/apparmor.d/tunables/multiarch.d   for   @{multiarch}   and
   /etc/apparmor.d/tunables/xdg-user-dirs.d for @{XDG_*}.

   The special @{profile_name} variable is set to the profile name and may be used in all policy.

   Notes on variable expansion and the / character

   It  is  important  to  note  that  how AppArmor performs variable expansion depends on the context where a variable is used. When a variable is expanded it can result in a string with
   multiple path characters next to each other, in a way that is not evident when looking at policy.

   Eg.

       Given the following variable definition and rule

       @{HOME}=/home/*/ file rw @{HOME}/*,

       The variable expansion results in a rule of

       file rw /home/*//*.

   When this occurs in a context where a path is expected, AppArmor will canonicalize the path by collapsing consecutive / characters into a single character. For the above example, this
   would be

     file rw /home/*/*,

   There is one exception to this rule, when the consecutive / characters are at the beginning of a path, this indicates a posix namespace and the characters will not be collapsed.

   Eg.

       @{HOME}=/home/*/ file rw /@{HOME}/*,

       will result in an expansion of

       file rw //home/*//*,

       which is collapsed to

       file rw //home/*/*,

       Note: that the leading // in the above example is not collapsed to a single /. However the second // (that was also seen in the first example) is collapsed.

Alias rules

   AppArmor also provides alias rules for remapping paths for site-specific layouts. They are an alternative form of path rewriting to  using  variables,  and  are  done  after  variable
   resolution.   Alias   rules   must   occur   within   the   preamble  of  the  profile.  System-wide  aliases  are  found  in  /etc/apparmor.d/tunables/alias,  which  is  included  by
   /etc/apparmor.d/tunables/global. /etc/apparmor.d/tunables/global is typically included at the beginning of an AppArmor profile.

Globbing (AARE)

   File resources and other parameters accepting an AARE may be specified with a globbing syntax similar to that used by popular shells, such as csh(1), bash(1), zsh(1).

   *   can substitute for any number of characters, excepting '/'

   **  can substitute for any number of characters, including '/'

   ?   can substitute for any single character excepting '/'

   [abc]
       will substitute for the single character a, b, or c

   [a-c]
       will substitute for the single character a, b, or c

   [^a-c]
       will substitute for any single character not matching a, b or c

   {ab,cd}
       will expand to one rule to match ab, one rule to match cd

       Can also include variables.

   @{variable}
       will expand to all values assigned to the given variable.

   When AppArmor looks up a directory the pathname being looked up will end with a slash (e.g., /var/tmp/); otherwise it will not end with a slash. Only rules that match a trailing slash
   will match directories. Some examples, none matching the /tmp/ directory itself, are:

   /tmp/*
       Files directly in /tmp.

   /tmp/*/
       Directories directly in /tmp.

   /tmp/**
       Files and directories anywhere underneath /tmp.

   /tmp/**/
       Directories anywhere underneath /tmp.

Rule Qualifiers

   There are several rule qualifiers that can be applied to permission rules.  Rule qualifiers can modify the rule and/or permissions within the rule.

   priority
       Specifies the priority of the rule. Currently the allowed range is -1000 to 1000 with the default priority of rule is 0.  Rules with higher priority are given preferences and will
       completely override permissions of lower priority rules where they overlap. When rules partially overlap the permissions of the higher priority rule will completely override lower
       priority rules within in overlap. Within a given priority level rules that overlap will accumulate permissions in the standard apparmor fashion.

   allow
       Specifies that permissions requests that match the rule are allowed. This is the default value for rules and does not need to be specified. Conflicts with the deny qualifier.

   audit
       Specifies that permissions requests that match the rule should be recorded to the audit log.

   deny
       Specifies that permissions requests that match the rule should be denied without logging. Can be combined with 'audit' to enable logging. Conflicts with the allow qualifier.

   owner
       Specifies that the task must have the same euid/fsuid as the object being referenced by the permission check.

   Qualifier Blocks

   Rule Qualifiers can be applied to multiple rules at a time by grouping the rules into a rule block.

     audit {
        /foo r,
        network,
     }

#include mechanism

   AppArmor provides an easy abstraction mechanism to group common access requirements; this abstraction is an extremely flexible way to grant site-specific rights and makes writing  new
   AppArmor profiles very simple by assembling the needed building blocks for any given program.

   The  use  of  '#include'  is  modelled  directly  after cpp(1); its use will replace the '#include' statement with the specified file's contents.  The leading '#' is optional, and the
   '#include' keyword can be followed by an option conditional 'if exists' that specifies profile compilation should continue if the specified file or directory is not found.

   #include "/absolute/path" specifies that /absolute/path should be used.  #include "relative/path" specifies that relative/path should be used,  where  the  path  is  relative  to  the
   current  working  directory.  #include <magic/path> is the most common usage; it will load magic/path relative to a directory specified to apparmor_parser(8).  /etc/apparmor.d/ is the
   AppArmor default.

   The supplied AppArmor profiles follow several conventions; the abstractions stored in /etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/ are some large clusters  that  are  used  in  most  profiles.  What
   follows are short descriptions of how some of the abstractions are used.

   abstractions/audio
       Includes accesses to device files used for audio applications.

   abstractions/authentication
       Includes access to files and services typically necessary for services that perform user authentication.

   abstractions/base
       Includes files that should be readable and writable in all profiles.

   abstractions/bash
       Includes many files used by bash; useful for interactive shells and programs that call system(3).

   abstractions/consoles
       Includes read and write access to the device files controlling the virtual console, sshd(8), xterm(1), etc. This abstraction is needed for many programs that interact with users.

   abstractions/fonts
       Includes access to fonts and the font libraries.

   abstractions/gnome
       Includes read and write access to GNOME configuration files, as well as read access to GNOME libraries.

   abstractions/kde
       Includes read and write access to KDE configuration files, as well as read access to KDE libraries.

   abstractions/kerberosclient
       Includes file access rules needed for common kerberos clients.

   abstractions/nameservice
       Includes file rules to allow DNS, LDAP, NIS, SMB, user and group password databases, services, and protocols lookups.

   abstractions/perl
       Includes read access to perl modules.

   abstractions/user-download
   abstractions/user-mail
   abstractions/user-manpages
   abstractions/user-tmp
   abstractions/user-write
       Some profiles for typical "user" programs will use these include files to describe rights that users have in the system.

   abstractions/wutmp
       Includes write access to files used to maintain wtmp(5) and utmp(5) databases, used with the w(1) and associated commands.

   abstractions/X
       Includes read access to libraries, configuration files, X authentication files, and the X socket.

   Some of the abstractions rely on variables that are set in files in the /etc/apparmor.d/tunables/ directory. These variables are currently @{HOME} and @{HOMEDIRS}. Variables cannot be
   set  in profile scope; they can only be set before the profile. Therefore, any profiles that use abstractions should either #include <tunables/global> or otherwise ensure that @{HOME}
   and @{HOMEDIRS} are set before starting the profile definition. The aa-autodep(8) and aa-genprof(8) utilities will automatically emit #include <tunables/global> in generated profiles.

Feature ABI

   The feature abi tells AppArmor which feature set the policy was developed under. This is important to ensure that kernels with a different feature set don't enforce features that  the
   policy doesn't support, which can result in unexpected application failures.

   When policy is compiled both the kernel feature abi and policy feature abi are consulted to build a policy that will work for the system's kernel.

   If the kernel supports a feature not supported by the policy then policy will be built so that the kernel does NOT enforce that feature.

   If  the  policy  supports a feature not supported by the kernel the compile may downgrade the rule with the feature to something the kernel supports, drop the rule completely, or fail
   the compile.

   If the policy abi is specified as kernel then the running kernel's abi will be used. This should never be used in shipped policy as it can cause system breakage when a new  kernel  is
   installed.

   ABI compatibility with AppArmor 2.x

   AppArmor 3 remains compatible with AppArmor 2.x by detecting when a profile does not have a feature ABI specified. In this case the policy compile will either apply the pinned feature
   ABI as specified by the config file or the command line, or if neither of those are applied by using a default feature ABI.

   It is important to note that the default feature ABI does not support new features added in AppArmor 3 or later.

EXAMPLE

   An example AppArmor profile:

           # which feature abi the policy was developed with
           abi <abi/3.0>,

           # a variable definition in the preamble
           @{HOME} = /home/*/ /root/

           # a comment about foo.
           /usr/bin/foo {
             /bin/mount          ux,
             /dev/{,u}random     r,
             /etc/ld.so.cache    r,
             /etc/foo.conf       r,
             /etc/foo/*          r,
             /lib/ld-*.so*       rmix,
             /lib/lib*.so*       r,
             /proc/[0-9]**       r,
             /usr/lib/**         r,
             /tmp/foo.pid        wr,
             /tmp/foo.*          lrw,
             @{HOME}/.foo_file  rw,
             /usr/bin/baz        Cx -> baz,

             # a comment about foo's hat (subprofile), bar.
             ^bar {
               /lib/ld-*.so*       rmix,
               /usr/bin/bar        rmix,
               /var/spool/*        rwl,
             }

             # a comment about foo's subprofile, baz.
             profile baz {
               #include <abstractions/bash>
               owner /proc/[0-9]*/stat r,
               /bin/bash ixr,
               /var/lib/baz/ r,
               owner /var/lib/baz/* rw,
             }
           }

FILES

   /etc/apparmor.d/

KNOWN BUGS

      Mount  options  support  the  use  of  pattern  matching  but mount flags are not correctly intersected against specified patterns. Eg, 'mount options=**,' should be equivalent to
       'mount,', but it is not. (LP: #965690)

      The fstype may not be matched against when certain mount command flags are used. Specifically fstype matching currently only works when creating a new mount and not remount, bind,
       etc.

      Mount rules with multiple 'options' conditionals are not applied as documented but instead merged such that 'options in (ro,nodev) options in (atime)' is equivalent to 'options in
       (ro,nodev,atime)'.

      When specifying mount options with the 'in' conditional, both the positive and negative values match when specifying one or the other. Eg, 'rw' matches when 'ro' is specified  and
       'dev' matches when 'nodev' is specified such that 'options in (ro,nodev)' is equivalent to 'options in (rw,dev)'.

SEE ALSO

   apparmor(7), apparmor_parser(8), apparmor_xattrs(7), aa-complain(1), aa-enforce(1), aa_change_hat(2), mod_apparmor(5), and <https://wiki.apparmor.net>.

AppArmor 4.1.0 2025-04-10 APPARMOR.D(5)